Extract: Chill winds blow for Arab spring
The Australian
Greg Sheridan, Foreign Editor
Thursday, August 4, 2011
THE Arab Spring has turned cold. Cold and nasty. It's certainly far too early to write off the potential benefits of the Arab upheaval. As the great Egyptian writer and liberal activist, Tarek Heggy, told me some time ago: "Any outcome is possible; even a good outcome." But if it's half-time, or perhaps quarter-time to use an AFL analogy, the opposing team has scored a lot of points and liberal reform is well behind. The international consequences, so far, are not very pleasant either.
Take the countries one by one. Last week saw a mass demonstration in Cairo by many thousands of Islamists who celebrated the presence of known extremists with long records of calling for jihad and violence. This week, Islamists helped the army clear out some of the few remaining secular protesters from Tahrir Square. There are signs of an alliance building between the Islamists and the army, though it may be that the army remains a critical force for stability as Egypt develops politically.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian economy is flowing rapidly down the toilet. Tourism is dead and a prodigious capital flight is under way. The protesters, the Islamists and even the army all have reasons, substantial or tactical, to demonise business people. But when you demonise business you guarantee the exodus of wealth. On some estimates, by the year's end, Egypt will be unable to pay for its imports or feed its people. And just to cheer you up, the latest polls show the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots would score spectacularly well in a parliamentary election, although it's true that these polls vary pretty widely. An even more extreme Salafist group of parties is also scoring solid backing. My Egyptian friends consistently informed me that the public moderation of the Islamists during the Egyptian uprising was temporary, tactical and fraudulent.
In Tunisia, where it all began, the economy has also tanked, and the hitherto most socially liberal of Arab states has seen a rise of intolerant Islamism.
In Libya, we are in the midst of a horrible stalemate. The only two tyrants to fall so far are those in Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries most well-disposed toward the US. In Libya, the grotesque Muammar Gadaffi clings to power. While NATO has intervened militarily in Libya, it has done so in an exceptionally cack-handed way. Prepared to rain lethal bombs on Gaddafi's forces, and give full diplomatic recognition to Libya's rebels, it has not provided them with tank-busting weapons, suitable anti-mine equipment, artillery or much else. A faction of the rebels murdered their military commander, General Abdel Fattah Younis, a key Gaddafi lieutenant who had defected. Therefore the longer the stalemate the less likely we are to get a clean transition to a decent government.
Brief update: Gaddafi and his forces lost the Battle of Tripoli in August and on 16 September 2011 the NTC took Libya's seat at the UN, replacing Gaddafi. He retained control over parts of Libya, most notably the city of Sirte, to which it was presumed that he had fled. Although Gaddafi's forces initially held out against the NTC's advances, Gaddafi was captured alive after his convoy was attacked by NATO warplanes as Sirte fell on 20 October 2011 but was then killed by the rebels the same day.
In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad has killed thousands of people. The enduring courage of the Syrian protesters is astonishing. The Syrian economy, which unlike Libya has no oil to speak of, is also going down the drain.
In Yemen, the future looks very bloody. The old regime has not been toppled and the local al-Qa'ida affiliate is still full of fight.
In Bahrain, protesters representing a Shi'ite majority under Sunni rule have been crushed.
In Saudi Arabia, the unreconstructed absolute monarchy has spent money on social programs to bribe its people, but has actually tightened censorship and political control.
In Lebanon, where for a time a pro-Western coalition ruled, the government is now dominated by Hezbollah. Many of the elements we once took comfort from in the Arab Spring have changed. It's true that al-Qa'ida, Hezbollah and Iran were taken by surprise by the Arab uprisings, and neither controlled nor much influenced them. But these forces are well and truly in the game now.
The character of the Arab Spring is changing partly as a result. What about some other international consequences? For Israel, two are obvious. The first is that it is now surely only the certifiably insane who would argue that Israel is central to the dysfunction and conflict within the Arab world. The Arab Spring, and the grievances that fuelled it, had nothing to do with Israel (except in people's minds - Steve). The second consequence for Israel is that it cannot possibly consider peace treaties — with its neighbouring states or with the Palestinians — until the shape of the new Middle East is clear, certainly until it knows whether its peace with Egypt will hold.
The Arab Spring had some alarming consequences too for China. It shows that economic growth does not guarantee stability (namely Egypt and Tunisia), nor does efficient, brutal Stalinism (namely Syria). It also showed that paranoid nationalism and a focus on phony external enemies (namely the entire Arab world and Israel) does not guarantee stability either. And it reinforced Beijing's belief that the social media are dangerous if not controlled because they can lead to civic mobilisation. So the result of the Arab Spring in China has been a renewed wave of extremely severe internal repression.
And the Arab Spring has not been very good for Washington either. The Obama administration has been marginal during the entire process. Its comic mis-readings of Egypt and repeated contradictions and day-late adjustments of position — the then Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak went from member of the family, to stabilising force overseeing reform, to someone who should step down, to a war criminal, in a few short weeks — had only one benefit. It showed Washington was not calling the shots.
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